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We document the market response to an unexpected announcement of proposed sales of government-owned
shares in China. In contrast to the "privatization premium" found in earlier work, we find a negative
effect of government ownership on returns at the announcement date and a symmetric positive effect
in response to the announced cancellation of the government sell-off. We argue that this results from
the absence of a Chinese political transition to accompany economic reforms, so that the positive effects
on profits of political ties through government ownership outweigh the potential efficiency costs of
government shareholdings. Companies with former government officials in management have positive
abnormal returns, suggesting that personal ties can substitute for the benefits of government ownership.
The "privatization discount" is higher for firms located in Special Economic Zones, where local government
discretionary authority is highest. This is consistent with the view that firms in these locations are
more dependent on government connections. We also find that companies with relatively high welfare
payments to employees, which presumably would fall with privatization, benefit disproportionately
from the privatization announcement.
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We study the effects on the market returns of  partially privatized Chinese firms of  
announcements of  proposed sales of  remaining government shares. There is a vast empirical 
and theoretical literature on the political economy of  privatization (see Megginson and Netter 
for a recent survey). The empirical work in this area has emphasized the efficiency gains that 
come from privatization; almost uniformly, researchers have found that privately-owned firms 
have higher measured profits and efficiency than government-run firms, both in the 
cross-section and also as a result of  performance changes following public share offerings of  
government companies.2 
 While the theoretical literature has also often focused on the efficiency gains from 
privatization (see, for example, Shleifer, 1998), the net impact on profits is in fact ambiguous. In 
particular, managers in firms with government ties may use those connections to boost profits. 
These benefits could, in theory, outweigh the positive effects on profits from private control, 
which may be associated with improved governance, productive efficiency and greater 
single-minded pursuit of  profit (rather than social ends). That is, in the terminology of  Shleifer 
and Vishny (1998) there are the offsetting effects of  the “helping hand” and “grabbing hand” 
of  government on firms’ profits (while we use their terminology, we note that our focus is 
narrowly confined to firms’ profits, in contrast to a broader view of  social benefits and costs 
that they consider).  
In general, governments that implement privatization programs also embark on a 
simultaneous set of  economic and political liberalizations intended to improve privatized firms’ 
prospects. Thus, it is not surprising that privatization premia are generally found to be positive 
(i.e., that the grabbing hand effect on profits dominates) since privatization tends to coincide 
with changes in the broader economic and political environment that enhance firms’ 
performance by reducing government dominance over the economy.  
The Chinese privatization experience, however, is unusual from that perspective. China’s 
approach to privatization and liberalization has been piecemeal and gradual, and state 
dominance over economic affairs remained largely intact during the process of  privatization. 
                                                        
2 For cross-sectional analyses, see Ehrhich et al (1994), Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), LaPorta and López-de-Silanes (1999) 
among many others. For studies on post-privatization performance changes, see Gupta (2005), Meggionson et al (1994), 
Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), Boubakri and Cosset (1998) among many others. 
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During the 2001 episode that we study here, when the government contemplated the sale of  
remaining state shares in partly privatized firms, the Chinese government’s proposed sale of  its 
shares did not coincide with a broad economic liberalization. Thus, actual and prospective 
privatization in China occurred within an unusual economic and political environment, in which 
the government maintained substantial control over the economy. 
The Chinese government maintained substantial stakes in many publicly traded firms, 
which were partially privatized during the 1990s through share issue privatizations (SIPs). In 
2000, the government held on average 32 percent of  companies that were publicly traded at that 
time, and that government stake consisted of  61 percent of  non-tradable shares. On July 24, 
2001, the government announced that it would sell some fraction of  its remaining shares to 
ordinary investors, suddenly giving credibility and clarity to an ambiguously worded prior 
statement on future privatization. As we have already discussed, based on prior research one 
might expect this announcement to generate a positive response from investors in firms where 
the government had retained substantial stakes. However, we find that government ownership 
has a negative effect on returns in response to this announcement (henceforth Event 1), and a 
symmetric positive effect when the government suddenly announced the cancellation of  its 
plans to sell state owned shares on June 23, 2002 (henceforth Event 2) 
   These results may be attributed to the peculiar trajectory of  Chinese political and economic 
development, where political control over the economy has remained widespread despite 
economic reforms. Political rule remains firmly authoritarian, as indicated by its Polity IV 
democracy rating of  -7 on a scale from -10 to 10 which has remained unchanged since 1976. 
Further, while allowing private ownership, the government has not been shy about interfering in 
commerce and the economy, and this type of  interventionist government may be more willing 
to “grab” profits from private rather than state-owned firms. Finally, in this statist system with 
poor private sector enforcement institutions, the long-term governance improvements from 
privatization might never materialize, as weak private governance is likely to lead to value loss 
through tunneling and expropriation, as documented in Morck et al. (2005). The market’s 
negative response to further privatization is consistent with these arguments, and suggests that a 
more careful consideration of  the institutional environment is important in evaluating the 
relative effects on corporate profits of  helpful government connections and costly government 
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mandates, both of  which may be related to the extent of  public ownership. 
 The events we study also allow us to compare the effects of  formal, ownership-based 
connections with the effect of  personal political ties that have been the focus of  much previous 
research (see Faccio (2006) for a global perspective and Fan et al (2007) for work focused on 
China). We find that the presence of  managers that had previously been employed in the local 
government bureaucracy has a positive effect on the announcement of  the government sell-off  
and a symmetric negative effect in response to the policy’s cancellation. We argue that this is 
consistent with investor belief  of  an increased importance of  personal ties to government, 
given the expected end to institutional connections. 
 Finally, we provide some tentative evidence on the channels through which connections add 
value by looking at how the impact of  government ownership on event returns differs by firm 
characteristics. We find a strong negative effect of  location in a Special Economic Zone (SEZ), 
which we argue serves as a proxy for discretion in local economic policymaking, interacted with 
government ownership; this is consistent with the hypothesis that discretionary local 
government policy may be used to benefit government-affiliated companies. We also find that 
the “privatization discount” is lower for firms with generous spending on non-wage worker 
amenities, as indicated by a positive interaction with government ownership. This is consistent 
with viewing these obligations as more likely to persist under government ownership. Finally, we 
find little impact of  the interaction between leverage and government ownership, suggesting 
that in China in 2001, variation in government lending was not a primary source of  variation in 
favor provision, as least for firms in our sample. 
    The rest of  this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we provide the institutional 
background on Chinese public firms and the government ownership of  those firms, and present 
our main hypotheses. In Section 3, we describe the two policy experiments and our sample of  
firms in greater detail. Section 4 presents our main results on event returns and also a range of  






2. Privatization background 
 
China embarked on ambitious economic reforms after the death of  Mao in 1979.3 As part of  
these reforms, thousands of  SOEs have been partially privatized through SIPs. The number of  
IPOs in China, most of  which are SIPs, rose from eight in 1990 to 1,483 in 2006, while the 
number and value of  shares issued soared from 0.048 billion shares valued at 0.081 billion RMB 
(renminbi) in 1990 to 130.1 billion shares valued at 681.4 billion RMB in 2006 (GTA, 2007). As a 
result, there are now many publicly-traded companies in China with varying degrees of  
government ownership and control. However, the government’s shares in these publicly traded 
companies cannot be freely traded.  
 Two elements of  this “partial privatization” are of  note in considering managerial 
incentives in these firms. First, given the partial private ownership, it is natural to expect that in 
order to satisfy private sector owners, management will use available resources to promote 
profitability. Second, the government itself  would be interested in promoting the profitability of  
these firms. Most obviously, higher profits may serve as a source of  government revenues. 
Further, the government intended to sell off  stakes in these firms in the future, and increasing 
profitability would be central to that agenda. Empirically, there is a link between firm 
profitability and managerial turnover at partially privatized firms (Bai and Xu, 2005), implying 
the presence of  profit-based incentives for managers. And given these incentives, it is natural to 
expect that government ownership ties would be exploited to serve this end. 
    In addition to non-tradable government shares, there are three other types of  ownership 
of  publicly traded Chinese firms. Legal-person shares (faren gu) are partially negotiable, 
dividend-earning shares offered to domestic (mainland Chinese) institutions such as other 
joint-stock companies and non-bank financial institutions. These shares were, for the most part, 
obtained at the time of  the IPO, and as such, government ties were crucial in obtaining them. 
As a result, they went almost exclusively offered to government-related entities, and in some 
cases, also to institutions owned by former government officials. Until December 11, 2001, 
trading in these shares was limited to purchases by state-owned or state-controlled institutions 
through negotiation or auction upon approval from the provincial government.4 As a result, at 
                                                        
3 See Naughton (2007) and Branstetter (2007) for detailed descriptions of  the reform process in China. 
4 Although private companies formally have the right to buy those non-tradable shares, there are no such cases in our sample. 
Also the provincial government has the last say in approving any transfer. In practice, it has generally not been possible for 
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the time of  the announcements we consider here, legal-person shares were held primarily by 
quasi-government entities or firms with strong government affiliations. Hence, these 
non-tradable shares handed out by the Chinese government may be considered to serve a similar 
governance function as government shares themselves – to provide government connections –  
and may cause the same governance problems as government stakes (See Sun et.al (2002) for a 
further discussion of  legal-person shares). 
Individual shares (geren gu), sold to domestic (mainland Chinese) investors represent a third 
type of  ownership. These were held mostly by individuals and a few domestic institutions, and 
were dividend-earning and fully tradable. Until May 2005, these were the only shares that were 
allowed to trade on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Collectively, state shares, 
institutional shares, and individual shares are termed “A” shares.  
Finally, foreign shares have been offered since late 1991 as a way to attract indirect foreign 
investment. These “B” shares are sold to foreign individuals and institutions. They are traded on 
the mainland Chinese stock exchanges in a market that is separate from A shares – this market 
segmentation will be important for distinguishing government ownership effects from share 
supply effects in our later analyses.5  
In accordance with the gradual pace of  China’s economic transition, the state has often 
required that the majority of  shares in SOEs be held by state institutions; by the end of  2000, 
non-tradable shares still constituted about two-thirds of  shares outstanding. All the firms with B 
shares also have outstanding non-tradable A shares, while almost all of  the firms with 
outstanding tradable A shares (all but eight firms) also have non-tradable A shares. 
 
Announcement of  government share sales 
On July 24, 2001 (Event 1), four public firms (FenghuoTongxun, BeishengYaoye, JiangqiGufen, 
HuafangGufen) announced that their government-owned shares would be sold in the A-share 
stock market; investors inferred that legal person shares would also be allowed to trade as a 
result of  this announcement. This was typical of  Chinese reforms, where government policy is 
revealed through the actions of  ‘model’ firms that effectively provide the details of  proposed 
                                                                                                                                                                           
private firms to obtain these transfers at favorable prices. 
5 Until recently, it was illegal for non-Chinese (non-mainlanders) to buy and sell A shares; in December 2002, foreign investors 
were given limited rights to trade in A shares under the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor system. And until recently, 
mainland Chinese could not invest in B shares or trade in international markets; as of  March 2001, they could buy and sell B 
shares, but only using legal foreign-currency accounts. 
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reform plans, as described in Fan (1996)6. As implied by the structure of  the plans announced 
by these four firms, both legal-person and explicitly state-owned shares would be sold. 
In this case, these four firms were demonstrating the reform intentions of  an earlier and 
highly ambiguous statement by government officials. That earlier announcement on June 14, 
2001 by the Ministry of  Finance had disclosed a temporary act enabling the sale of  state-owned 
equities. This was a very ambiguously worded statement, the meaning of  which was unclear for 
several reasons: first, it was announced as a temporary measure with no clear deadline; second, 
there were no details on how the program would be carried out; third, important policies about 
public firms typically are announced by the CSRC rather than the Ministry of  Finance. Thus, 
investors were unsure about the credibility of  the statement. We do not include this 
announcement in our cross-sectional regression analysis below. 
The July 24 announcement was not well received by the market. 7 The China B-share 
index declined by 10.5 percent during the three-day window around the announcement, 
indicating on average a perception of  declining future profits in firms owned partly by the 
government as a result of  the announcement. The notion that this average decline reflected the 
effects of  government involvement in these firms is confirmed by the cross-sectional effects we 
document in our analysis below, which show that the higher the government ownership 
percentage the larger the decline in value.8  
Over the course of  the next year the government reconsidered its position. On the evening 
of  June 23, 2002, the government cancelled its plans for the sale of  government-owned shares. 
The market responded positively to this announcement (Event 2), and the B-share index 
increased by 12.7 percent during the three-day window surrounding the announcement date. 
 Several key features of  Chinese policy statements, in general, and these announcements 
specifically, make them particularly well-suited to event study analysis. First, in China important 
regulatory changes are typically announced without any prior discussion among interested 
groups. This sharply contrasts with policy events in the United States and other democratic 
countries, where information leakage related to lobbying and public debate is a serious concern. 
                                                        
6 This process is called ‘Muo Zhe Shitou Guohe’ in Chinese (“Wading across the stream by feeling the way”), a phrase created 
by Deng Xiaoping..  
7 Chinese stock market regulation limits the price change for any company in a single day to 10 percent.  
8 We focus on B shares as the key indicator of  market perceptions of  firm profits. Because B shares are all tradable 
and are segmented from A shares in the market their returns offer a clearer indicator of  changes in expected future 
profitability than the returns of  tradable A shares, which may reflect effects unrelated to future profits but related 
to anticipated changes in the supply of  tradable A shares resulting from sales of  government A shares. 
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In the specific case of  our events, the lack of  prior knowledge is supported anecdotally by the 
huge price swings on the announcement dates.  
The unique structure of  the Chinese stock market (the segmentation of  tradable A, 
non-tradable A, and B shares), and the availability of  B share prices, allows us to avoid 
complications relating to government sales announcements (especially changes in the expected 
supply of  tradable A shares attendant to the expected sale of  non-tradable A shares) that would 
otherwise blur the interpretation of  our results. If  demand for stocks slopes downward, then 
adverse effects on A share returns associated with government announcements of  sales could 
result simply from an expected increase in tradable shares, which would be proportional to 
government ownership. By restricting our sample to firms with outstanding B shares (so-called 
B-share firms), and by using B share returns to measure announcement effects, we avoid this 
problem.  
Several others aspects of  these two announcements are worth mentioning. Many Chinese 
government proclamations are riddled with ambiguity, thereby clouding any interpretation of  
investor response. In contrast, our events are uncharacteristically clear and direct in their content, 
allowing for a relatively clear interpretation of  the market response. Furthermore, the specific 
content of  the two events we analyze implies a unique advantage in our study. The 
announcements of  the plan and its cancellation are symmetric and opposite in effect, which 
permits us to test twice for any hypothesized effects in two separate episodes. In particular, this 
helps to allay concerns that observed results are driven by other market events that might be 
present on one or the other of  the event dates. We will present our results separately, but will 
also provide results where we pool data from both events.  
 
3. Data and Sample 
Our sample consists of  the 107 B-share firms9 traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges that have transaction price data for the two policy experiments as well as basic 
financial information. We obtained adjusted closing price data for these firms from Datastream. 
In our main regressions, we report risk-adjusted returns. In order to construct the market model, 
                                                        
9 Two B-share firms are excluded because they were not traded in our event windows. Both pure B share firms and A/B share 
firms are included, wherea pure B share firm only issues B shares, and an A/B share firm issues both A shares (traded by 
domestic investors) and B shares (traded by foreign investors). We also exclude two “ST” firms; these are companies that had 
earned negative net profits for two consecutive years, and for which no financial data are available; both of  these firms have 
subsequently been delisted (Chinese firms are delisted after three consecutive years of  negative profits). 
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we obtain data on the Chinese stock market index (which includes both A and B shares) from 
the China Stock Market Trading Database (CSMAR).  A standard market model (MacKinlay, 
1997, p. 18) is used to calculate the benchmark return and the abnormal return over the -1 to 1 
event window. Throughout, our primary outcome measure is the three-day cumulative abnormal 
return over the window [-1,+1], which we denote by CAR[-1,1]. Due to the 10 percent price 
movement limit on single-day returns, it is essential to include Date = +1 in our window, and we 
further include Date = -1 in order to allow for some information leakage prior to the 
announcement.  We will also report results based on raw returns, CR[-1,1], and returns over a 
shorter two-day window, CAR[0,1]. 
To construct our measure of  personal political ties, we manually collected the resumes of  
senior managers 10  for our 107 firms, which may be found on the website of  Sina 
(finance.sina.com.cn), a Nasdaq-listed internet content provider that provides comprehensive 
financial information on Chinese listed firms.11 These resumes provide details of  career paths, 
and, in particular, report whether the manager has served as the “major” or “vice-major” (the 
equivalent of  mayor or deputy mayor) in the city where the company is located. We define an 
indicator variable Politial_Connection that denotes companies that employ at least one such 
individual in senior management. As indicated in the summary statistics below, 13 of  our 109 
firms are connected by this definition at the time of  Event 1, and 11 were connected at the time 
of  Event 2. Broadening our definition to include direct ties to the provincial or national 
government (as in Faccio, 2006) makes no difference in practice in our context, as these 
connections are very rare in China (there are none in our sample). We avoid extending our 
definition of  connections to town governments, since these are not very influential 
administrative units. City-level officials have discretion over local economic policies, while 
town-level officials do not enjoy such rights (Wei et.al (2002)). 
Ownership structure data are derived from CSMAR. Of  particular interest for our analyses 
is the fraction of  A-shares that consist of  non-tradable government shares. We denote this by 
Govt_share. We denote the fraction of  A-shares owned by legal-persons as LP_share. As 
explained in the preceding section, these legal-person, non-tradable A shares were affected in 
the same way as government shares by the events we study here, and ownership of  legal person 
                                                        
10 CEO, Vice-CEO, Chairman and Vice-Chairman, where Vice-CEO corresponds to CTO, CFO and other similar titles in the 
United States. 
11 This information is only available in Chinese on the Sina website. 
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shares can generally be traced back to governmental or quasi-governmental entities.  
We include various controls. Log(Sales) serves as a basic control for size. While there is no 
clear theoretical rationale for controlling for measures of  existing profitability, we include ROA 
and Tobin’s Q to check the robustness of  our results (our results are virtually identical if  we use 
ROE rather than ROA as a control). The data to construct these measures are obtained from 
Resset (www.resset.cn), a widely used provider of  data on the China stock market. ROA is the 
net return on net assets, and Tobin’s Q is the ratio of  market value over book value of  the firm. 
These were cross-checked for accuracy with those provided at the Sina website 
(finance.sina.com.cn). 
For our analyses of  the potential channels through which political ties affect firm value, we 
generate a number of  additional covariates.  
First, we define SEZ, an indicator variable denoting whether the firm is based in a city that 
is a Special Economic Zone (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, Shantou, and Hainan) as a measure of  
local government discretion in economic policymaking. Generally speaking, SEZ cities’ 
governments have more autonomy than other local governments in setting local economic 
policies, particularly for those firms that have foreign ownership (see Xiong (2006) for an 
extended discussion). Foreign ownership is a key feature of  virtually all the firms in our sample, 
since our sample consists of  firms with outstanding B shares. Non-SEZ local governments 
typically require approval from the central government in order to provide preferential 
treatment of  a local firm; by contrast, the SEZ governments enjoy considerable freedom in this 
regard (Xiong (2006) provides an illustration of  this point in its description of  economic policy 
discretion exercised by the Zhuhai government). 
We use Leverage (defined as the ratio of  long-term bank borrowing over total assets, and 
obtained from Resset) to assess the extent to which political ties may have generated preferential 
loan access. Finally, as possible measures of  “social goods” provided by firms that may result 
from political pressures, we generate two regressors. The first is the ratio of  retired employees 
that are supported by the firm as a fraction of  the number of  current employees. We obtain 
these data from the firms’ 2001 annual reports, and define this ratio as Pension_burden. As a 
measure of  benefits provided by the firm to its workers, we use the firm’s Commonweal fund, 
which funds such amenities as barber shops, pre-schools, and hospitals. We define Welfare_rate 
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as these “Commonweal” expenditures deflated by sales. Again, these data are obtained from 
companies’ annual reports in 2001. 
As we have already noted, due to the separation of  A and B share markets, the selling of  
government stakes should have no expected supply effect on B-share market prices. As an 
additional check, we include a variable, turnover, which denotes average share turnover in the 
A-Share market in the year prior to Event 1. If  liquidity were an important part of  the 
explanation for price declines in Event 1, then higher turnover should have a positive effect on 
Event 1 returns. 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. One noteworthy pattern is the near equality of  
the magnitude of  average returns for the two events. In Figure 1a, we show the scatterplot 
relating abnormal returns CAR[-1,1] for the two events. There is a weak negative correlation 
between the two. In Figures 1b and 1c we show scatterplots relating Govt_share + LP_share to 
CAR[-1,1] for Event 1 and Event 2 respectively. Consistent with government ownership having 
an opposite impact on returns in each event the correlation is negative for Event 1 (ρ=-0.20) 
and positive for Event 2 (ρ=0.22). This suggests the possibility of  pooling data from the two 
events in our regression analyses, which we discuss below. 
 
4. Results  
We begin with analyses for the two events separately. Our main specification is as follows: 
 
CARei{-1,1] = α + β1*Govt_shareei + β2*LP_shareei  
           + β3*Political_Connectionei + Controlsei + εei 
 
where e is the event number, i indexes the firm, and ε is a disturbance term. We allow for 
robust standard errors throughout. 
 Results for Event 1 are reported in Table 2, columns (1) – (4). In column (1) we show the 
specification with only Govt_share and LP_share as regressors. Only Govt_share is significant 
at conventional levels, though the coefficients are both negative and very similar in magnitude, 
implying a negative effect of  government ownership on announcement returns. This is 
consistent with a “helping hand” view of  the government impact on profits. The coefficient of  
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0.04 implies a one percentage point negative return for a one standard deviation (0.25) increase 
in Govt_share. We use Political_Connection as a covariate in column (2); its coefficient is 
positive, though not significant at conventional levels (p-value=0.14). In column (3) we include 
Govt_share, LP_share, and Political_Connection together as regressors, and add SIC one-digit 
industry fixed effects and log(Assets) to control for size. The coefficients on both Govt_share 
and LP_share increase, though the coefficient on Political_Connection falls by about 20 percent. 
In column (4) we add profitability controls; the coefficients on both Govt_share and LP_share 
increase once again. 
 In columns (5) – (8) of  Table 2 we report the results of  these specifications for Event 2. 
For this cancellation event, we find that the coefficients of  interest are of  opposite signs to 
those of  Event 1 and comparable in magnitudes. 
 In Table 3 we present the results pooling data from both events, but using negative 
CAR[-1,1] for the cancellation event (Event 2) and including an Event 2 indicator variable. All 
regressions allow for clustering of  standard errors at the level of  the firm. We present the basic 
result in column (1).12 Given the preceding results, it is not surprising that we generate 
estimated coefficients that are similar in magnitude to those presented in Table 2, but of  
somewhat higher levels of  statistical significance. The coefficient on Political_Connection is 
now marginally significant at conventional levels (p-value=0.08). In columns (2) and (3) we 
present results using raw returns CR[-1,1] and two-day returns CAR[0,1] respectively. Again, the 
results are qualitatively unaffected. Finally, we present the results of  a specification that gives 
greater flexibility to the relationship between government ownership and returns. We define two 
indicator variables, I[0.25<Govt_share≤0.50] and I[Govt_share>0.50], that denote firms with 
Govt_share between 0.25 and 0.50, and Govt_share greater than 0.50 respectively. The results, 
reported in column (4), do not reject a monotonic negative relationship between Govt_share 
and returns. Finally, in column (5) we include turnover as a control. If  our results were driven 
largely by concerns over changes in the expected supply of  tradable A shares, then turnover 
should be a strong predictor of  event returns. The coefficient on turnover is indistinguishable 
from zero, however, and its inclusion does not affect the coefficients on our variables of  
interest. 
                                                        
12 The coefficients are insensitive to inclusion/exclusion of controls in this pooled regression. 
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 Finally, we note that there are concerns regarding the endogeneity of  government 
ownership. The direction of  a potential bias is unclear. On the one hand, the government may 
have chosen to maintain ownership in the firms where there is the greatest impact on profits 
from government ties. In this case, we are likely overestimating the net benefits from 
government ties. Alternatively, the government may have maintained high ownership stakes in 
companies that could be used to further social objectives, in which case the bias could be in the 
opposite direction. 
 
Identifying the costs and benefits of  government ownership 
Our results above indicate that in the Chinese context the positive effects on profits from 
government connections related to higher government ownership may have outweighed the 
costs associated with government ownership. By exploiting additional cross-sectional variation 
in firm attributes, we now investigate the possible sources of  government-related benefits. If  
our results were driven by preferential local government policy, we would expect our results to 
vary according to the extent of  discretion in the economic policymaking of  local governing 
bodies. Our best proxy for the extent of  policy discretion is whether the firm is located in a 
Special Economic Zone, a designation that is associated with greater economic autonomy of  
local governments.  
 In our econometric specification, we allow for a greater impact of  government ownership 
in SEZ’s through the inclusion of  the interaction term Govt_share*SEZ, and also a greater 
influence of  personal ties as a result of  government divestment through the interaction term 
Political_Connection*SEZ. In Table 4 column (1) we report results including just the direct 
effect SEZ. The SEZ indicator variable takes on a coefficient of  -0.018 and is significant at the 
1 percent level, implying that firms located in SEZ’s had returns 1.8 percentage points lower 
than non-SEZ firms. More interestingly, in column (2) we include the interaction terms. 
Govt_share*SEZ is significant at the 1 percent level and takes on a value of  -0.047, implying 
that the impact of  being located in an SEZ is much greater for firms with government 
ownership. In terms of  magnitude, Govt_share has a standard deviation of  0.25, implying that 
an increase in Govt_share of  one standard deviation increases the impact of  being located in an 
SEZ by more than one percentage point. 
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 The coefficient on Political_Connection*SEZ is positive, significant at the 1 percent level, 
and takes on a value of  0.057. This is consistent with the view that investors expect personal ties 
to be more valuable in the wake of  government divestment. Note finally that the coefficient on 
the direct effect of  SEZ (i.e., a firm with both Govt_share and Political_Connection equal to 
zero) is now indistinguishable from zero, consistent with the impact of  the SEZ variable 
working primarily through political channels. 
In the early stage of  China’s economic transition, government banks were described by the 
Chinese as being an “ATM for the mayor of  the local government.” (called ‘Shizhang Pitiao’ in 
Chinese). In a similar vein, prior research has focused on the lending channel, or “soft budget 
constraint,” as a source of  government handouts (see, in particular, Khwaja and Mian, 2005; 
Berglof  and Roland, 1998). 
A primary prediction of  lending as a channel of  favors would be a higher leverage ratio for 
firms with stronger government connections. However, we do not find any such relationship in 
our sample (results not reported here). Additionally, if  the lending channel were an important 
source of  government favors, we would expect leverage to enter significantly in our regressions, 
as an indicator of  reliance on government favors. In Table 4 column (3) we present a 
specification including only the direct effect of  Leverage; its coefficient is indistinguishable from 
zero. We add the interaction terms in Table 4 column (4); the coefficient on 
Govt_share*Leverage is negative (indicating that firms with both high leverage and high 
government ownership experienced larger negative returns from the privatization 
announcement) and marginally significant (p-value = 0.12). The weak effects related to leverage 
may reflect market-oriented banking reforms that had already taken place prior to our events. In 
particular, the Central Bank of  China adopted many measures during the 1990s to make local 
banks independent of  local governments in its business operation (see Brandt and Zhu (2007); 
for a more detailed treatment in Chinese, see Wang (2005)). Alternatively, it may simply be the 
result of  the characteristics of  our sample, which consists only of  B-share firms, all of  which 
had at least some access to alternative (foreign) sources of  funds in addition to local bank 
financing. Further investigation of  the lending channel is an important avenue for further 
research. 
Finally, we consider potential heterogeneity in benefits that firms might receive from 
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reduced government ownership. In the absence of  a well-developed social security system, 
SOEs in China have traditionally served a welfare function for their employees (Bai et.al, 2006). 
As a result, state-owned firms fulfill this social role, providing workers with non-wage amenities 
and also providing pension benefits to retired workers. If  reduced government ownership is 
expected to reduce these obligations, then share prices for firms with greater non-wage or 
pension burdens may react relatively positively to the news of  privatization, and this effect may 
be concentrated in firms with high government ownership. In Table 4 column (5) we include 
Welfare_rate, the ratio of  firm expenditures on employee welfare to sales, as a covariate. Its 
coefficient is positive, though not significant. In column (6) we add the interaction terms 
Govt_share*Welfare_rate and Political_Connection*Welfare_rate. Consistent with the view that 
firms with closer government ties may be forced to provide greater worker amenities, the first 
of  these interaction terms is positive and significant at the five percent level; the coefficient on 
Political_Connection*Welfare_rate is negative, but not significant at conventional levels.  
Finally, in columns (7) and (8) we include Pension_burden and its interactions with 
Govt_share and Political_Connection. In column (7) we find that the direct effect of  
Pension_burden is positive though not distinguishable from zero. In column (8) we find that 
Pension_burden’s interaction with Govt_share is close to zero, while its interaction with 
Political_Connection is negative and significant at the 1 percent level. This implies that firms 
with high pension obligations and personal political ties may be more likely to continue to pay 
retired workers, perhaps for political reasons. However, given the relatively small number of  
connected firms, these results should be interpreted with some caution. 
In summary, our results provide some evidence on the channels through which firm value 
may be affected by government ownership in China. Statistically, our most robust results relate 
to city-level autonomy in economic policymaking.  
 
6. Conclusions 
    In this paper, we analyze two opposite policy announcements in China relating to the sale 
of  government-owned shares. We find that the stock market responds negatively to anticipated 
further privatization and positively to the cancellation of  this proposed policy. We also find that, 
cross-sectionally, higher government ownership has a negative effect on firm returns during the 
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privatization announcement, and a positive effect during the cancellation announcement. Our 
regression results suggest that government ownership is associated with benefits to 
government-connected firms in an economy like China’s where government continues to 
exercise substantial control over the economy. Our results indicate that, at least from the 
perspective of  firm profitability, reduced government ownership is not always favorable. The 
benefits to firms from increased privatization are contingent on privatization being accompanied 
by broader economic liberalization. Our evidence also lends support to the general view that 
institutions matters for economic performance and growth. 
 Government ownership of  firms is not the sole determinant of  the extent to which firms 
gain or lose from government connections. Personal connections between firms and local 
governments can substitute for institutional connections related to government ownership. And 
the extent to which local Chinese government connections affect firm profitability varies with 
the extent of  local government discretion, as proxied by the location of  the firm in a Special 
Enterprise Zone. Finally, firms with higher existing burdens relating to their government 
connections (higher welfare payments for employees) benefit the most from privatization, since 
they stand to gain the most from eliminating their institutional connections to government. 
Two caveats about our results bear emphasis. First, our analysis of  returns measures 
expected gains to stockholders from privatization announcements, not net social gains. It is 
possible that privatization could reduce the expected profits of  publicly traded firms with 
government connections, but still increase net social benefits through a variety of  channels 
(including the reduced incentives for government officials to attempt to control economic 
activity). 
Second, our analysis of  Chinese privatization ends with the failed attempt to sell 
non-tradable A shares in 2001-2002. There is some evidence that, more recently, China has 
combined further privatization of  firms with economic liberalization, and that this may have 
contributed to share price increases in recent years. In 2005, the Chinese government instituted 
a new plan for liquidating non-tradable A shares, based upon a framework whereby tradable and 
non-tradable shareholders of  each firm would enter into agreements on the terms for the sale 
of  non-tradable shares. These agreements established compensation in the form of  a transfer 
of  a proportion of  liquidated non-tradable A shares to existing holders of  tradable A shares. 
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Since 2005, the Chinese stock market has appreciated dramatically, and many observers have 
argued that share appreciation is related to the anticipated liquidation of  non-tradable shares. 
Consistent with our argument that privatization benefits are contingent on a liberalized economy, 
we note that the current liquidation of  non-tradable A shares has coincided with a reduction in 
state control over the economy. For example, three of  the “big four” state-owned banks have 
partially privatized since 2005, and there has been significant reform of  these state-banks’ 
operations. A wide variety of  additional financial sector reforms have been announced or 
contemplated (see Calomiris 2007).  
Unfortunately, it is not possible to perform informative event studies of  the post-2005 
experience comparable to those reported here for 2001-2002. When the state announced the 
April 29, 2005 reform, the market dropped by -0.85% on April 29, and -2.77% on the next 
trading day. This negative response is consistent with our findings for 2001 and 2002. But 
the initial announcement of reform in April 2005 was notoriously ambiguous, and the 
meaning of the proposal became gradually clarified over time. In particular, it was initially 
unclear how compensation would occur. The proposed firm-level arrangements entailed 
hard-to-predict compensation agreements involving transfers of  value among different classes 
of  shareholders, making it impossible to employ tradable A or B shares’ announcement returns 
as indicators of  expected changes in the profitability of  firms, per se. For example, even though, 
in the event, B shareholders were not included in the compensation agreements (negotiated 
transfers are only from non-tradable A shareholders to tradabale A shareholders) that fact was 
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Figure 1b shows the scatterplot relating Govt_share+LP_share to CAR[-1,1] for event 1, where 
Govt_share is the proportion of shares held by the state and state legal person and LP_share is the 








































Figure 1c shows the scatterplot relating Govt_share+LP_share to CAR[-1,1] for event 2, where 
Govt_share is the proportion of shares held by the state and state legal person and LP_share is the 















Table 1 - Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean  Standard deviation Median  
SEZ 0.248 0.434 0 
Leverage 0.053 0.083 0.018 
Welfare_rate 0.0044 0.0055 0.0026 
Pension_burden 0.1457 0.3585 0.0016 
Turnover 0.0189 0.0083 0.0176 
Event 1: 2001 year    
Govt_share 0.341 0.249 0.377 
Political_connection 0.119 0.326 0 
LP_share 0.119 0.187 0.0004 
ROA 0.116 0.208 0.112 
Leverage  0.179 0.351 0.075 
Log(Sales) 20.4 1.24 20.4 
log(1+Tobin's Q) 1.269 0.4066 1.1772 
CR101 (day -1 to day 1) -10.49 3.66 -10.96 
CAR101 (day -1 to day 1) -12.24 3.79 -12.55 
CAR01 (day 0 to day 1) -9.43 3.33 -9.02 
Event 2: 2002 year    
Govt_share 0.34 0.249 0.378 
Political_connection 0.101 0.303 0 
LP_share 0.119 0.187 0 
ROA 0.124 0.34 0.099 
Leverage  0.2 0.411 0.084 
Log (Sales) 20.5 1.16 20.6 
log(1+Tobin's Q) 1.3203 0.3544 1.2411 
CR101 (day -1 to day 1) 12.68 3.7 12.14 
CAR101 (day -1 to day 1) 12.11 3.75 11.42 
CAR01 (day 0 to day 1) 8.32 2.62 8.1 
Notes: Govt_share is the proportion of shares held by the state and state legal person, LP_share is the
proportion of shares held by private firms registered as legal persons. Political_connection is an indictor 
variable denoting that the focal listed firm has at least one senior officer who was ever a major or
vice-major of a city. ROA is the net return on total assets in the past year. Tobin's Q is the ratio of
market value over book value of the firm. Turnover is the turnover of the firm’s corresponding A-share 
in the past year before event 1. SEZ is an indicator variable denoting that the firm is located in a Special
Economy Zone. Leverage is the ratio of long-term banking borrowings to assets. Welfare_rate is the 
ratio commonweal funds to sales. Pension_burden is the ratio of retired employees supported by the
firm to its current employees. CR101 is the cumulative event return over the window of [-1, 1]. 
CAR101 is the cumulative abnormal event return over the window of [-1, 1]. CAR01 is the cumulative 
abnormal event return over the window of [0, 1]. 
Table 2 - Regresions of abnormal event returns on state-owned shares 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Govt_share (%) -0.044*  -0.052* -0.061** 0.046**  0.037* 0.048** 
 (0.023)  (0.026) (0.025) (0.019)  (0.020) (0.021) 
LP_share (%) -0.050  -0.055 -0.077** 0.060**  0.044 0.063** 
 (0.036)  (0.038) (0.035) (0.029)  (0.028) (0.028) 
Political_connection  0.015 0.014 0.013  -0.015** -0.017* -0.016* 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Log(Sales)   0.006* 0.011***   -0.008** -0.013*** 
   (0.004) (0.004)   (0.004) (0.005) 
ROA    -0.057    -0.021 
    (0.100)    (0.019) 
log(1+Tobin’s Q))    0.034***    -0.028** 
    (0.011)    (0.013) 
Event 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 
Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 
R-squared 0.04 0.02 0.21 0.31 0.05 0.02 0.19 0.22 
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is CAR101, the cumulative abnormal even return over the window
[-1,1]. Event 1 denotes the announcement on July 24, 2001 that the government would sell its stakes in publicly traded
firms. Event 2 denotes the retraction of this policy on June 23, 2002. Govt_share is the proportion of shares held by the
state and state legal person, LP_share is the proportion of shares held by by private firms registered as legal persons.
Political_connection is an indictor variable denoting that the firm has at least one senior officer who was ever a major 
or vice major of a city. ROA is the net return on total assets in the past year. Tobin's Q is the ratio of market value over
book value of the firm. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
 
Table 3 - Regression of abnormal event returns (Pooled) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Govt_share (%) -0.055*** -0.053*** -0.031**  -0.072*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)  (0.021) 
LP_share (%) -0.074*** -0.072*** -0.046** -0.063** -0.073** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.022) (0.024) (0.028) 
Political_connection 0.014* 0.014** 0.012** 0.015* 0.013* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
Log(Sales) 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
log(1+Tobin’s Q)) 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.026*** 0.033*** 0.028* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) 
ROA 0.021 0.022 0.005 0.021 0.026 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) 
Event Dummy -0.000 -0.023*** 0.009** -0.000 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
I(0.25<Govt_share0.5)    -0.017*  
    (0.009)  
I(Govt_share>0.5)    -0.028***  
    (0.009)  
Turnover     0.251 
     (0.385) 
Dependent Variable CAR101_pool CR101_pool CAR01_pool CAR101_pool CAR101_pool 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 214 214 214 214 164 
R-squared 0.22 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.18 
Notes:  CAR101_pool is equal to CAR101 for Event 1 and equal to -1* CAR101 for event 2; CR101_pool and 
CAR01_pool are similarly defined. See the text for further details. Govt_share is the proportion of shares held by 
the state and state legal person, LP_share is the proportion of shares held by by private firms registered as legal
persons. Political_connection is an indictor variable denoting that the firm has at least one senior officer who was
ever a major or vice major of a city. ROA is the net return on total assets in the past year. Tobin's Q is the ratio of
market value over book value of the firm.  I(0.25<Govt_share0.5) is an indicator variable denoting that 
0.25<Govt_share0.50.  IGovt_share>0.5) is an indicator variable denoting that Govt_share>0.50.  Turnover is
the turnover of the firm’s corresponding A-share in the past year before event 1. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses, disturbance terms clustered by firm. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 4 - Identifying the mechanism of beneficial government ownership 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Govt_share (%) -0.063*** -0.049** -0.055*** -0.045** -0.052*** -0.075*** -0.057*** -0.054*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
LP_share (%) -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.073*** -0.070** -0.071*** -0.077*** -0.072*** -0.072*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
Political_connection (PC) 0.010 0.009 0.013* 0.009 0.013* 0.024** 0.014* 0.021** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) 
SEZ -0.018** -0.006       
 (0.007) (0.010)       
Govt_share*SEZ  -0.057**       
  (0.022)       
PC*SEZ  0.048***       
  (0.015)       
Leverage (Banking Borrowing)  0.011 0.034     
   (0.029) (0.040)     
Govt_share*Leverage    -0.165     
    (0.104)     
PC*Leverage    0.063     
    (0.062)     
Welfare_rate     0.598 -0.598   
     (0.460) (0.764)   
Govt_share*Welfare_rate      4.165**   
      (1.817)   
PC*Welfare_rate      -1.747   
      (1.361)   
         
 1
Table 4 - Identifying the mechanism of beneficial government ownership (cont’d) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Pension_burden       0.006 0.021 
       (0.006) (0.025) 
Govt_share*Pension_burden        -0.028 
        (0.053) 
PC*Pension_burden        -0.072** 
        (0.028) 
Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 214 
R-squared 0.25 0.28 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.24 
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is CAR101_pool, which is equal to CAR101 for Event 1 and equal to -1* CAR101 for Event 2. See text for 
further details. All specifications include log(Sales), log(1 + Tobin's Q) and an Event dummy as controls (not reported for saving space). Govt_share is the 
proportion of shares held by the state and state legal person, LP_share is the proportion of shares held by by private firms registered as legal persons.
Political_connection is an indictor variable denoting that the firm has at least one senior officer who was ever a major or vice major of a city. SEZ is an
indicator variable denoting that the firm is located in a Special Economy Zone. Leverage is the ratio of long-term banking borrowings to assets. Welfare_rate is
the ratio of commonweal fund expenditures to sales. Pension_burden is the ratio of retired employees supported by the firm to its current employees.  Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, disturbance terms clustered by firm. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
